Overconfidence, incentives and digit ratio by Neyse, Levent et al.
1Scientific RepoRts | 6:23294 | DOI: 10.1038/srep23294
www.nature.com/scientificreports
Overconfidence, Incentives and 
Digit Ratio
Levent Neyse1, Steven Bosworth1, Patrick Ring1,2 & Ulrich Schmidt1,3,4
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the biological underpinnings of overconfidence 
by analyzing performance predictions in the Cognitive Reflection Test with and without monetary 
incentives. In line with the existing literature we find that the participants are too optimistic about their 
performance on average; incentives lead to higher performance; and males score higher than females 
on this particular task. The novelty of this paper is an analysis of the relation between participants’ 
performance prediction accuracy and their second to fourth digit ratio. It has been reported that 
the digit ratio is a negatively correlated bio-marker of prenatal testosterone exposure. In the un-
incentivized treatment, we find that males with low digit ratios, on average, are significantly more 
overconfident about their performance. In the incentivized treatment, however, we observe that males 
with low digit ratios, on average, are less overconfident about their performance. These effects are not 
observed in females. We discuss how these findings fit into the literature on testosterone and decision 
making and how they might help to explain seemingly opposing evidence.
Social comparison theory suggests that individuals make predictions in both social and individual contexts every 
day1. For example, the decision to participate in a costly competition is driven by predictions about one’s own 
abilities relative to the competitors’2,3. While under certain circumstances it appears beneficial to base such a 
decision on accurate judgments, in some situations it may be advantageous to be overconfident4. Different types 
of overconfidence have been observed and discussed in the literature5.
Among other things, overconfidence can have a positive impact on one’s own motivation and a detrimental 
impact on competitors’ motivation6–8. If this is the case, overconfidence increases the probability of success and 
therefore could be seen as an adaptive survival strategy9. Empirically, overconfidence has a positive impact on 
success in academia10 and war11. Additionally, it seems to promote human well-being by giving oneself a positive 
view of the future12,13. It does not, however, increase the chances of success in every situation, because overcon-
fident beliefs are by definition inaccurate14. Therefore, they can be exploited by rational agents15. For instance, 
overconfident investors trade too much and thereby reduce their earnings16. Overly optimistic beliefs about the 
future potentially explain the high rates of business failure17. These findings suggest that the adaptiveness of over-
confidence is highly sensitive to the strategic context in which it is deployed.
Despite this trade-off, overconfident judgments are a manifested trait of human decision making18. This trait 
is not balanced across genders however. While both males and females can be overconfident on average, males’ 
beliefs tend to be even more biased19. Gender differences in overconfidence, for example, can have substantial 
impacts on willingness to compete: Men are more likely to select into tournament compensation schemes than 
women, and male overconfidence explains a large share of this gap2.
Based on the gender difference found in confidence levels, the sex hormone testosterone has been proposed 
as a biological underpinning. Predictions based on current findings about the effect of testosterone on confi-
dence levels are unclear: On the one hand, one might predict that individuals with high testosterone levels show 
higher levels of confidence. Body language, for example, can increase circulating testosterone levels and thereby 
self-confidence judgments20. Additionally, an increase in testosterone after losing makes people more likely to 
engage in a subsequent competition21. Furthermore, an increase in testosterone leads to a greater willingness 
to take financial risk22. Testosterone and cortisol are also reported to increase financial risk taking, which may 
destabilize markets23. Some studies also apply the digit ratio method (the ratio between the length of the index 
finger to the length of the ring finger, DR) to study the relation between confidence levels and testosterone. It has 
been reported in the literature that DR is a negatively correlated bio-marker of prenatal testosterone exposure24. 
In a recent study, for example, it has been shown that preschool children with low DR are overconfident in motor 
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skill tasks25. On the other hand, individuals with higher testosterone levels may show lower levels of confidence in 
certain contexts. Financial traders with low DR, for example, earn higher long-term returns and stay longer in the 
market26. This may suggest that their judgments seem to be more accurate, i.e., less biased. Similarly, males with 
low DR are less likely to overestimate their actual performance in the “Tower of Hanoi” puzzle.
We particularly focus on the relationship between performance prediction accuracy and DR, which is one 
of three main methods for investigating testosterone’s effects on behavior. Many studies examine how circulat-
ing testosterone impacts decision making by either measuring its levels from saliva samples or by exogenously 
manipulating it27. Alternatively, the ratio between the lengths of the second and the fourth digits of hands has 
been proposed as bio-marker of prenatal testosterone exposure, which is thought to affect brain development and 
also sensitivity to circulating androgens24,28, and thereby more plausibly explains inter-individual differences in 
behavior. The relationship between DR and prenatal testosterone is negative, i.e., a low DR indicates a high level 
of prenatal testosterone exposure and vice versa29. Testosterone levels during early development can influence 
subsequent sex-typical behavior, such as overconfidence30. Furthermore, there is evidence for a negative relation-
ship between DR and risk taking31,32, although there also exist null results in the literature23. We apply the DR as a 
bio-marker for prenatal testosterone exposure and study its relation to confidence levels.
In our study, participants were asked to answer the seven-item Cognitive Reflection Test33 (CRT). The 
seven-item CRT is an extension of the three-item CRT34. As dual system theories indicate, there are two cognitive 
systems that can be employed in human decision making. System 1 requires less effort and it is therefore fast but 
relies more on heuristics. System 2, on the other hand, requires more reasoning and time. System 1 reasoning 
yields intuitive but wrong answers on the CRT; thus employing System 2 is necessary for correct answers35. For 
example, the first item of the CRT is “A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?” Although the intuitive wrong answer is 10 cents, the correct answer is 5 cents. The full task can 
be found in the supplementary materials.
After completing the CRT, participants estimate their number of correct answers and the average number of 
correct answers among all participants in their session. This enabled us to study two aspects of overconfidence: 
the belief in one’s own performance relative to a) one’s actual performance and b) to one’s belief in the group’s 
performance. Moore and Healy refer to the former as overestimation and the latter as overplacement. We discuss 
the terminology in the discussion section. In half of our sample, both the task and the accuracy of guesses were 
incentivized, while in the other half they were not. This implies that in half of our sample wrong answers and 
inaccurate beliefs were “costless”, while in the other half they were not.
Our decision to explore the interaction between incentives, confidence levels, and DR is motivated by two 
particular concerns. Firstly, there is a folk tradition within experimental economics that questions whether phe-
nomena from the behavioral decision research literature persist when it becomes costly to persist in them – i.e., 
when incentives are introduced36,37. Specific to confidence levels, relatively little overconfidence has been found 
when incentives for accurate guesses are given and subjects are given repeated feedback about performance38. 
Moore and Healy (2008) show that people tend to be overconfident for difficult tasks and underconfident for easy 
tasks5. Their design incentivizes guesses with a quadratic scoring rule, however, making it unclear whether this 
is simply due to subject risk aversion39. Moreover, the relation between testosterone and behavior is reported to 
be context-dependent40,41. Given that compelling links exist between testosterone and both confidence levels and 
incentives, it makes sense to explore their interaction.
Methods
Participants. We recruited 146 men and 139 women from the student population of the Kiel University 
(N = 285, mean age = 24.0 years). The experiment was organized and recruited with the software hroot42. 
Participants met in groups of 15 and were randomly assigned to seats in a classroom. At the beginning of the 
experiment, subjects were given general instructions about the procedure, which were followed by the experi-
mental task described below. After the experiment, participants were invited one by one to a separate room to 
receive their payment and to scan both of their hands.
Experimental Task. Participants were asked to answer the seven-item CRT within 10 minutes. After 10 min-
utes, the experimenters collected all answer sheets in order to prevent participants from making any changes on 
the task sheets. Then, they were asked to estimate their number of correct answers and the average number of 
correct answers within the group. It was announced that the group’s performance would be rounded to the near-
est integer. In about half of our sample, each correct answer on the CRT was awarded with 0.5€ and each correct 
guess about one’s own and others’ scores was rewarded with 2€. This information was given in the corresponding 
task sheets separately to avoid strategic behavior.
Digit Ratio. Following common recommendations43, both hands were scanned with a high-resolution scan-
ner (Epson V370 Photo). To determine DR, we measured the lengths of the index and ring digits on both hands 
from basal crease to the fingertip using the computer software Adobe Photoshop® (Adobe Systems Inc., San Jose, 
USA).
Two independent raters measured the digit lengths. The DRs obtained from both raters had very high intra-
class correlations (0.983 for the right hand DR and 0.977 for the left and DR). We averaged the raters’ measure-
ments to conduct our analysis.
Although the DR studies often focus on the right hand data and a meta-analysis concludes that the right hand 
ratio is a better indicator, there are also numerous papers employing left hand ratios or even the means of both44. 
We study the data for both hands separately but focus on interpreting the right hand DR results. Results gathered 
from right and left hand DRs are consistent.
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Confidence Scores. An overestimation score was calculated for each individual as the difference between the 
individual’s estimate about her number of correct answers on the CRT and her true number of correct answers. 
Similarly, an overplacement score was calculated for each individual as the difference between the individual’s 
estimate about her number of correct answers on the CRT and her estimate about others’ performance.
Ethics Statement. All participants of the experiment were informed about the content and the protocol of 
the study before they participated. Their anonymity was preserved by assigning them a randomly generated code 
that cannot be associated with any personal information or decisions. As is standard in economic experiments, 
no ethical concerns were involved other than preserving the anonymity of the participants. Furthermore, each 
participant was individually briefed about the DR measurement. This briefing included a general overview about 
testosterone-related studies in the social sciences and the assured anonymity of their data. We made it clear that 
hand scans are not related to any identifying information and that the scans would not be shared with third par-
ties under any circumstance and will be deleted immediately after the finalization of the study. Participation in the 
experiment and scanning were completely voluntary. The whole protocol was in accordance with the Declaration 
of Helsinki and conformed to the ethical guidelines of the Kiel University Experimental Economics Lab, where it 
was approved by the lab manager.
Results
Descriptive Statistics. Subjects in all conditions are substantially overconfident in themselves on average. 
While actual performance on the seven-item CRT was 4.24 correct answers on average, subjects thought that 
they answered 5.44 questions correctly on average. This difference (i.e., overestimation) is significant according 
to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p = 0.000). People also estimated their own performance to be significantly bet-
ter than others’, which they predicted at 5.12 correct answers. A signed-rank test also rejects equality between 
expected own and other performance, indicating overplacement in the overall sample (p = 0.000).
Incentives lead to both higher performance and higher expectations of performance. Average correct answers 
to the CRT are 4.04 without incentives and 4.46 with (rank-sum p = 0.033). Expected own performance increases 
from 5.18 correct answers to 5.74 correct answers (rank-sum p = 0.000). Note that incentives actually increase 
overconfidence, though not significantly (rank-sum p = 0.692). The expected performance of others remains 
unchanged at an average of 5.12 in both incentive conditions.
There are additionally gender differences in performance and confidence relative to others. The average per-
formance of women was 3.68 questions answered correctly, while men answered 4.76 questions correctly on 
average. This difference is significant according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.000). This gender effect is 
in line with the previous literature34,45. Men and women display similar levels of overconfidence, with women 
estimating themselves as answering 1.29 more questions correctly than actual performance and men overesti-
mating by 1.10 questions. These are not significantly different (rank-sum p = 0.373). When we focus on the two 
treatments, this result remains both for incentivized and un-incentivized conditions (rank-sum p = 0.908 and 
p = 0.282 respectively). Men are, however, significantly more likely to say they will perform better than others (on 
average 0.639 questions better) than are women (who say they will perform 0.029 questions worse than others on 
average the difference between genders has a rank-sum p = 0.000). This result is valid for both incentivized and 
un-incentivized treatments separately as well (rank-sum p = 0.000 for both).
Women appear to respond more to incentives than do men, but this difference is not significant. Women 
increase their performance from 3.28 to 4.04 questions answered correctly, while men increase theirs from 4.61 
to 4.98. A linear regression estimating the interaction between gender and incentive conditions has a two-tailed 
p-value of 0.331 on the interaction coefficient (robust standard errors are estimated). A full breakdown of results 
by gender and incentives treatment is shown in Figure 1.
Digit ratios. In our sample, men had a mean right hand DR of 0.956 with a standard deviation of 0.0281, 
whereas women had a right hand DR of 0.967 with a standard deviation of 0.0362. This difference is significant 
(rank-sum p = 0.007). For the left hands, the mean among women is 0.970 with a standard deviation of 0.0341, 
and the male mean is 0.9610 with a standard deviation of 0.0281 (rank-sum p = 0.004). The correlation between 
the right and left hand DRs is 0.727 for men and 0.765 for women. Supplementary materials Figure S1 gives a 
fuller picture of how the distribution of right hand DR varies by gender, with women having a DR much closer 
to 1 but also much more variable, and men clustering more around 0.96. It should also be noted that there is no 
relationship between DR and CRT performance (see Supplementary Table S1).
Ultimately we are interested in prenatal testosterone exposure, for which the right hand and the left hand DRs 
are noisy indicators. Traditionally, the right hand DR is a more reliable indicator for testosterone exposure44. We 
therefore focus on interpreting the right hand results, though we report all regression results using the left hand 
DR as well. These are consistent with, though less precisely estimated than, the right hand relationships.
Table 1 estimates the relationship between DR, overestimation, and overplacement using ordinary least 
squares regression analysis. Because the DR variable has been standardized, the coefficients on dr represent the 
expected effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in DR on the outcome variable at the mean of the DR distri-
bution. Stars indicate significance at the 10% level for a single star, at the 5% level for two stars, or at the 1% level 
for three.
Indicators and interaction terms have been added to estimate effects separately by gender and incentive con-
dition. We do this to convey the maximum amount of information, though the resulting estimates require care to 
interpret. Here the excluded category is men in the no incentives treatment. Therefore the coefficient on dr alone 
represents the expected change in the outcome variable for a one standard deviation increase in DR among men 
in the no incentives condition. The expected change in the outcome variable for an increase of one standard devi-
ation among women in the no incentives condition is therefore the coefficient on dr plus the coefficient on female 
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X dr. Likewise for men in the incentives treatment the expected change in the outcome variable from a one stand-
ard deviation increase in DR is represented by the sum of the coefficient on dr plus the coefficient on incentives X 
dr; and finally the expected change in the outcome from a one standard deviation increase in DR among women 
in the incentives treatment is represented by the sum of the coefficients on dr, female X dr, and female X dr X 
incentives.
The first two columns estimate the impact of DR on overestimation, defined as the difference between 
expected own CRT score and actual performance, controlling for actual performance. The first finding here is 
that for both genders in both conditions, more poorly performing people are more overconfident (by about a half 
point for each full point of actual performance, on average). In some sense this is mechanical, as it is not possible 
to be overconfident about a perfect score, for example.
We also see that men with lower DR are significantly more overconfindent in their abilities (also by roughly 
a quarter point for each standard deviation in DR, p-value 0.001), but only in the no incentives condition. It is 
interesting to contrast the impact of incentives on overestimation for men at the mean of the DR distribution with 
Figure 1. Actual and expected CRT performance by gender and incentive condition. 
Dep var
Overestimation Overplacement
Left hand Right hand Left hand Right hand
crt_correct
− 0.553*** − 0.557*** – –
(0.0417) (0.0425) – –
guess_other
– – − 0.344*** − 0.351***
– – (0.0871) (0.0868)
dr
− 0.134 − 0.287*** − 0.170 − 0.274**
(0.106) (0.0894) (0.120) (0.116)
female
− 0.499*** − 0.517*** − 0.900*** − 0.914***
(0.178) (0.181) (0.200) (0.203)
incentives
0.453*** 0.420** 0.606*** 0.573***
(0.168) (0.171) (0.175) (0.175)
female 0.0582 0.255 0.109 0.239
X dr (0.163) (0.169) (0.206) (0.202)
incentives 0.478** 0.460*** 0.182 0.201
X dr (0.215) (0.166) (0.175) (0.177)
female − 0.0157 − 0.00880 0.106 0.102
X incentives (0.255) (0.263) (0.270) (0.275)
female X dr − 0.302 − 0.263 0.107 0.110
X incentives (0.293) (0.250) (0.292) (0.275)
constant
3.58 3.62 2.20 2.25
(0.224) (0.226) (0.488) (0.482)
N 281 281 280 280
R2 0.440 0.447 0.210 0.220
Table 1. Impact of DR’s interaction with incentives on estimation. Note: Ordinary least squares regression 
analysis: Robust standard errors are indicated in brackets. Independent variables are crt_correct for the number 
of correct answers in the CRT, dr for standardised DR, female is a dummy variable with 1 for women, incentives 
is a dummy variable with 1 for the incentive condition. We had 285 observations. This number is reduced here 
due to missing information for some participants.
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the impact of incentives on men one standard deviation lower in the DR distribution. While men at the mean 
of the distribution become more (over)confident on average when incentives are introduced (by over 0.4 correct 
answers, p-value 0.015), men with low DR in the incentives condition are not significantly more confident in their 
abilities compared to low DR men in the no-incentives condition, (p-value 0.862). To see this in the regression, 
subtract the coefficient on incentives X dr from that on incentives. Incentives also reverse the expected difference 
between a man at the mean of the DR distribution and one who is a standard deviation below. Whereas without 
incentives the low-DR man was 0.287 points more confident on average (p-value 0.001), with incentives the 
low-DR man is 0.173 points less confident than the man at the mean of the distribution (adding the coefficients 
on dr with that on incentives X dr, though the p-value is only 0.215).
Note that none of these effects are seen among women. Neither a main effect of dr nor its interaction with 
the incentives treatment significantly predicts overestimation among women. Finally, while we did not see 
non-parametric evidence of differences in overestimation across genders, the regressions are picking up the 
expected finding that women are on average less confident in their own abilities than men.
The second two columns of Table 1 show a similar pattern. Here overplacement, defined as the difference 
between participants’ own expected performance and the expected performance of others, is regressed on DR, 
controlling for their guess about other’s performance. There is a strong impact of guess about others’ scores on 
relative confidence, similarly reflecting the fact that the higher one esteems others, the less possible it is to place 
oneself above them. Like with overestimation, men with higher DR are more likely to estimate their performance 
relative to others as higher, but only in the no incentives condition. We do not however see an interaction effect 
between overplacement and incentives among low-DR males (second two columns of Table 1).
To visualize the main results we have plotted the regression from the second column of Table 1 (overestima-
tion on right hand DR) as a series of bivariate graphs in Figure 2. Similar graphs for right hand DR on overplace-
ment may be found in Supplementary Figure S2.
Discussion
Without monetary incentives, we find that lower DR increases both average overestimation and overplacement in 
men. With monetary incentives, however, lower DR increases the accuracy of estimates about own performance 
among men on average, i.e., it reduces overconfidence. This result indicates that male participants with low DR 
are more sensitive towards changes in incentives and adapt their strategies accordingly. This result is discussed in 
the following part of the paper. The first part of the discussion sets our main results into perspective to the existing 
literature on the effect of testosterone on overconfidence and how it might help to explain seemingly opposing 
findings. The second part relates our findings to a limited literature on economic behavior and prenatal testos-
terone exposure. In the third part, we provide additional clarification for some of our results. Finally, potential 
limitations of our study are discussed.
Firstly, we outlined two competing hypotheses regarding the effect of testosterone on overconfidence in the 
introduction. While individuals with high levels of testosterone tend to be more overconfident in some contexts, 
they are less overconfident in others. Our results provide a potential explanation for these seemingly opposing 
findings. The main implication is that individuals with low DR are more sensitive towards changes in the incen-
tive structure. This potentially explains why financial traders with low DR earn higher long-term returns and 
stay longer in the market26. Overconfident beliefs in financial markets may be disadvantageous, because over-
confident traders trade too much and thereby reduce their net earnings16. In our experimental setting, men with 
low DR have less accurate predictions without incentives and more accurate predictions under incentives. This 
finding is in line with the previously outlined studies. On the other hand, body language can increase circulating 
testosterone levels and thereby confidence judgments20. We find that without monetary incentives, men with low 
DR overestimate their scores more. One possible explanation could be that they receive some form utility from a 
positive image of being better than their competitors. The positive impact of overconfidence on human well-being 
has already been discussed in the literature12,13. It seems that with monetary incentives, however, men with low 
DR value monetary profits higher than a positive self-image. This potentially explains their shift in behavior. Da 
Silva et al., by contrast, apply an un-incentivized task and find a negative correlation between DR and overconfi-
dence25 in pre-school children.
Secondly, our findings shed light on the relationship between testosterone and economic behavior. Several 
studies in the literature show that DR correlates with risk-taking preferences31,32 and also with incentives. Yet, 
those working papers on incentives and DR have not been published to this date.
Thirdly, several of our results need further clarification. While subjects’ estimates about their own perfor-
mance respond in significantly different ways across incentive schemes and DR, it seems puzzling why low-DR 
male subjects show the same increase in confidence relative to others in the incentives treatment as other subjects. 
Those with mean DR tend to become more confident relative to others when incentives are introduced. Fig. 1 may 
give some indication for why this is. We see that, on average, people perform better and they think they perform 
better when incentives are introduced, but their evaluation of others’ performance remains unchanged with the 
introduction of incentives. This naturally manifests as overplacement. However the low-DR males slightly lower 
their guesses about their own performance, and so must be lowering their estimate of others’ performance by 
comparatively more – since they display the same increase in overplacement as the other subjects.
We can also show that the interaction between DR and incentives is not due solely to differential changes 
in performance across incentive schemes. Supplementary Table S1 estimates the effect of DR on absolute CRT 
performance. There is no significant effect of DR on performance in either treatment, nor is there a significant 
difference between treatments. In contrast, Bosch-Domench et al.46 show a negative relationship between DR and 
performance in the 3 item-CRT in a Spanish sample46.
It is also interesting to note that DR has no significant impact on overestimation or overplacement among 
female subjects. We might expect that similar hormonal mechanisms are at work for both genders, but perhaps 
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the relationship between DR and overconfidence among males’ results from an interaction between prenatal 
testosterone exposure and differences in socialization across genders.
Our results may also be related to the connection between prenatal and adult testosterone. Current knowl-
edge on prenatal testosterone points out organizational effects on endocrine system (among others) and these 
effects may be seen in adults. One possible reason for our findings may be the short term spikes in circulating 
testosterone in competitive situations. In particular DR may be a negative marker for the amplitude of these 
peaks and sensitivity to testosterone itself. These peaks are much more likely to be found in males than females41. 
Crewther et al.47 also discuss the links between DR and sex-dependent challenge-induced peaks in testosterone47. 
The incentive condition may represent a challenge which results in an increase in testosterone in men but not 
women. This then may explain the difference between the DR-overconfidence correlation in the non-incentive 
condition (when testosterone is at background levels) and the DR-overconfidence correlation in the incentive 
condition (when testosterone may be elevated in a short-term peak).
We tried to use the terminology in a careful manner in the paper. The majority of the studies in the litera-
ture use the term, overconfidence. Yet, it should be noted that, although most of the participants are overconfi-
dent about their own performance, there also exist under-confident participants as well as those who estimated 
their correct answers correctly. 10.67% of the sample is under-confident and 18% made correct guesses in the 
un-incentivized condition. In the incentivized condition, under-confident participants are 6.02% of the sample 
and 23.30% estimated their scores correctly. For this reason, we use the word confidence as a relatively neutral 
term where necessary. For the dependent variable names on the other hand, we prefer to use the standard defini-
tion of Moore and Healy5. They differentiate between overly optimistic beliefs (1) about one’s performance relative 
to the actual performance (overestimation), (2) about one’s performance relative to others (overplacement), and 
(3) about the accuracy of one’s private information (overprecision).
Finally, limitations of our study should be discussed. Our participant sample consists solely of university stu-
dents and therefore suffers from the well-known representativeness bias of experimental studies48. Furthermore, 
studies on DR have several common drawbacks. DR is sensitive to ethnic differences49. Our sample however con-
tains only European Caucasian participants. It is a usual protocol to focus on the major subsample of the study or 
divide the large, multi-ethnic samples in smaller groups50. Another issue for DR studies is the repeatability of the 
Figure 2. Impact of DR on overestimation across gender and incentive condition. 
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measurements. Since the measurements of the images are done manually by human evaluators it is possible that 
measurements of different evaluators may not highly correlate in some datasets. One crucial precaution for this 
issue is the scanning quality. Following a standard scanning protocol as well as using a high resolution scanner 
is helpful. We repeat measurement of the digits, another recommended procedure. Additionally, automatized 
measurement methods and algorithms are being developed51. It is also worth mentioning that our results cannot 
be taken as conclusive for the biological underpinnings of overconfidence and the effects of incentives. According 
to Dual Inheritance Theory, human behavior is influenced by both social environment and genes. DR is shown to 
have genetic underpinnings52. Although investigating these underpinnings of human behavior is important, the 
environmental factors shaping human behavior cannot be a neglected.
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